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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the Nash equilibrium leads to inaccurate predictions
of human behaviour in a vast set of games. This observation has promoted the de-
velopment of new solution concepts like the quantal response equilibrium (QRE, see
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) or evolutionary equilibria that are based on the long-run
performance of a strategy (Antal et al., 2009; Ohtsuki, 2010). However, it is well-known
that the QRE is subject to framing effects: Duplicating a strategy affects the equilibrium
predictions. Here we show that the above mentioned evolutionary equilibria exhibit the
same inconsistency. Furthermore, we prove that such framing effects are inevitable if a
game theoretic solution concept depends differentiably on the payoffs. As a consequence,
we argue that differentiable equilibrium notions, while being of great help in analyzing
well-specified games, are unsuitable for theoretical modeling, where it is not clear which
payoff matrix gives the true representation of an economic interaction.
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1 Introduction
For any class of games, static or dynamic, with complete or incomplete information,
it is a simple task to create an example where the Nash equilibrium mispredicts human
behaviour, as shown for example in Goeree and Holt (2001). This holds true even for
the most simple games with only one rationalizable equilibrium, like in the traveller’s
dilemma introduced by Basu (1994). Suppose that two travelers, returning home from
their vacation, discover that the airline has lost their luggage. The airline asks both
travelers independently to make claims for compensation and, in order to prevent excessive
claims, determines that only the lower of both amounts will be paid. Additionally, it is
announced that if the claims are different, the person with the lower claim obtains some
reward R > 1, whereas the same amount R will be deducted from the other traveler’s
reimbursement as a penalty. In case that only claims between $180 and $300 are accepted,
the Nash prediction is straightforward: In order to rake in the reward, it is always optimal
to undercut the co-player’s claim by one dollar. Consequently, the lower bound of $180
is the unique equilibrium. While this analysis holds true for any R > 1, simple intuition
suggests that subjects in the laboratory may try to coordinate on a higher claim if R is
comparably low.1 Indeed, this intuition is confirmed by experiments: For R = 5, around
80 % of the subjects opt for the maximum claim; only if R is sufficiently increased, claims
approach the Nash equilibrium outcome (Goeree and Holt, 2001). Seemingly, subjects in
these experiments do not strictly stick to best responses and do not necessarily eliminate
dominated strategies.
These observations are the starting point for several alternative equilibrium notions. In
this article we will review two distinct examples, the quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and the evolutionary equilibrium described in Ohtsuki
(2010). Instead of considering traditional steplike best response correspondences, these
equilibrium notions assume that strategy choices are positively but imperfectly related
to payoffs.2 As a consequence, also dominated strategies may be played from time to
time, which in turn may affect equilibrium behaviour. Ironically, because these alternative
equilibrium notions allow a more realistic description of human behaviour, they also have
1As Kaushik Basu (1994) puts it, the strategy pair (”large”, ”large”) is a Nash equilibrium in ill-
defined categories; if a player is told that the other player will choose a large number and if the reward
R is neglectable, then the best reply is to choose a large number as well. This explanation bears some
similarity with the examples in Camerer and Fehr (2006), who describe under which conditions a minority
of irrational agents can trigger a majority of rational individuals to mimic the minority’s behaviour.
2The same idea has also been applied to some learning models, for example smooth fictitious play, see
Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
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a serious drawback: These equilibrium notions themselves are subject to framing effects.
Different representations of the same economic situation result in different predictions. In
particular, giving a strategy a second alias may affect the position of the equilibrium.
We proceed as follows: In the next section, we review the QRE and the evolutionary
equilibrium described in Ohtsuki (2010). We show how two seemingly equivalent games
can lead to diametrically opposed equilibrium predictions. While such framing effects
are well-known in the case of the QRE, they have not been previously reported for the
evolutionary equilibria. In Section 3 we give an unexpected sufficient condition for such
framing effects: If an equilibrium concept depends differentiably on the payoffs then in-
consistencies are inevitable.3 As a consequence it is argued in Section 4 that the QRE
and other differentiable equilibrium notions, although being of great help in analyzing
already specified strategic games, might be unsuitable for doing theory, where the true
representation of an economic problem is far from being clear.
2 Examples of equilibrium notions with framing effects
2.1 The quantal response equilibrium
The QRE was introduced by Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey, first for games
in normal form (1995) and later also for extensive form games (1998). Goeree et al.
(2005) provide an axiomatic foundation. Since then, this concept was applied to various
economic settings, including the traveler’s dilemma (Capra et al., 1999) or coordination
games (Anderson et al., 2001). Typically, the QRE outplays the Nash equilibrium by far
when it comes to predict human behaviour in laboratory experiments.4 Remarkably, the
QRE can also be used to estimate the rationality of the subjects (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995) and to which extent they believe in their co-player’s rationality (Weizsa¨cker, 2003).
For our purposes, it will be sufficient to consider the simplest case, a finite normal
form game between two players. The R-player chooses a row of the matrix M =
(
akl, bkl
)
,
whereas the C-player chooses a column. As usual, players are allowed to randomize
between their pure actions; we denote by pR and pC the respective mixed strategy vectors.
3Roughly speaking, differentiability means that small changes of the payoffs lead to a small and pre-
dictable change of the equilibrium. Note that the Nash equilibrium concept does not satisfy this condition,
since small changes in the payoffs may completely change the best response correspondences.
4The overwhelming success is illustrated by the following quote of Camerer et al. (2004): Quantal
response equilibrium, a statistical generalization of Nash, almost always explains the deviations from Nash
and should replace Nash as the static benchmark to which other models are routinely compared.
3
For each player K ∈ {R,C}, we denote by uKi the expected payoff of K’s pure action i,
which of course depends on the co-player’s strategy p−K , that is uKi = u
K
i (p
−K). A main
aspect of the QRE is that choice probabilities are positively but imperfectly related to
payoffs. According to the most commonly used parametrization of the QRE, the logit
rule, the probability to play action i is determined by the following stochastic reaction
function σ:
pKi = σ(u
K
i ) =
exp(λ · uKi )∑
j exp(λ · u
K
j )
(1)
The sum in the denominator ensures that the probabilities sum up to one. The pa-
rameter λ can be interpreted as a measure of rationality: λ = 0 means that actions are
chosen randomly from the set of possible alternatives, whereas for large λ the choice is
increasingly biased towards the strategy with the highest payoff. Note that as long as
λ < ∞, even dominated strategies get a positive weight. For analyzing data, the param-
eter λ is typically estimated using the maximum likelihood method. A logit equilibrium
is then defined as a fixed point of the map σ: A pair of mixed strategies pˆ = (pˆR, pˆC)
is an equilibrium if for both players K ∈ {R,C} and all their strategies i the following
condition holds:
pˆKi = σ
(
uKi (pˆ
−K)
)
. (2)
Such equilibria always exist but need not to be unique. As λ goes to infinity, logit
equilibria approach Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the graph of all fixed points pˆ contains a
unique branch, starting at the centroid of the strategy simplex for λ = 0 and converging to
a unique Nash equilibrium as λ approaches infinity, implying that the logit equilibrium can
be applied to the problem of equilibrium selection. Since the stochastic reaction function
σ depends differentiably on the payoffs for λ < ∞, by the implicit function theorem the
same holds true for each branch of the graph of the logit equilibria.5
Let us illustrate the logit equilibrium with an example taken from Goeree and Holt
(2001). Consider the following coordination game in which players receive $1.80 for co-
ordinating on the high equilibrium and $0.90 if they coordinate on the low equilibrium.
Additionally, the column-player has an outside option that guarantees a safe payoff of
$0.40:
5As we will see in Section 3, the smooth dependence on the payoffs plays a key role. It is valid not
only for the logit equilibrium but for the QRE in general, since stochastic reaction functions are generally
assumed to be differentiable, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) resp. Goeree et al. (2005).
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Figure 1: The unique branch of the logit equilibrium for the coordination game with
one, respectively with two outside options (x = 160). a) In the game with one outside
option, the value of x is small enough to enable subjects to coordinate on the high
equilibrium. b) However, if the problem is represented differently, splitting the safe
option in two, players are predicted to coordinate on the low equilibrium.
L H S
L 90, 90 0, 0 x, 40
H 0, 0 180, 180 0, 40
This game has two pure Nash equilibria, (H,H) and (L,L), and the safe option is never
part of an equilibrium. Nevertheless, as shown in Goeree and Holt (2004), the outside
option has a deciding influence on coordination behaviour in behavioural experiments. In
particular, the exact value of x controls which strategies are chosen, with sufficiently low
values of x prefering the (H,H) equilibrium. Such an effect is correctly predicted by the
logit equilibrium but not by the Nash equilibrium, see Fig. 1a for an example with x = 160:
The unique branch of the logit equilibrium, starting in the center for λ = 0 converges to
the high equilibrium in the limit of rational agents, λ→∞. To illustrate that the QRE is
subject to framing effects, we consider the same game, but with the second player having
two (identical) outside options:
L H S1 S2
L 90, 90 0, 0 x, 40 x, 40
H 0, 0 180, 180 0, 40 0, 40
(3)
While this additional strategy has no effect on the Nash equilibria, it alters the set
of logit equilibria (Fig. 1b): Giving the outside option a second name leads the logit
equilibrium to select the low instead of the high equilibrium. Thus, the prediction of the
logit equilibrium depends sensitively on the exact formulation of the alternatively possible
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strategies.6
2.2 Evolutionary equilibria
Ohtsuki (2010) considers the following model of an evolutionary dynamics for an asym-
metric game: There are two populations, a population R of row-players and a population
C of column-players, with population size NR resp. NC . Each player in R chooses a row i
of the matrix M = (akl, bkl) ∈ R
mn, whereas each player in C chooses a column j. Then,
every subject in population R plays against every subject in the other population, leading
to the payoffs uRi and u
C
j , respectively. Subsequently, the fitness fi of a player with strat-
egy i is defined by an exponential transformation of its payoff, i.e. fKi = exp(δu
K
i ) with
K ∈ {R,C}. The factor δ measures the importance of the game for the fitness of a player
and is usually called the strength of selection. If δ → 0, each agent has approximately the
same fitness, a case which is termed the weak selection limit.
After those interactions, one subject (of any of the two populations) is chosen at
random. This agent is allowed to change its strategy by imitating the strategy of another
player of the same population. It is assumed that strategies with higher fitness are more
likely to be adopted. More specifically, if NRk denotes the current number of row-players
with strategy k, then the probability that a randomly chosen row-player imitates an agent
with strategy i is given by
pRi =
NRi f
R
i∑
kN
R
k f
R
k
. (5)
Additionally, one allows mutations: With probability u, the agent does not imitate others,
but chooses randomly any of the available strategies.
Overall, this evolutionary dynamics results in a stochastic selection-mutation process
6In the above example one might argue that the inconsistency can be avoided if identical columns
are omitted by definition. However, if the game is marginally modified such that there are no identical
columns, elimination of the additional column seems unjustified:
L H S1 S2
L 90, 90 0, 0 x, 40 x+ ε, 40
H 0, 0 180, 180 0, 40 0, 40
(4)
More fundamentally, it is typically not the subjects who construct payoff matrices to help them with their
decisions, but it is the researcher who uses such tools to describe the decision maker’s behaviour. How
should one decide which matrix gives the true representation of the decision problem? Similarly, to adapt
the argumentation of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) on a related issue, elementary transformations, [like
giving a column a second alias], are irrelevant for correct decision making: after all, the transformed matrix
is just a different representation of the same decision problem, and decision theory should not be misled
by representation effects. To hold the opposite point of view is to admit that decision theory is useless in
real-life applications, where problems present themselves without a special formalism.
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without absorbing states. In some special cases, it is possible to explicitly calculate the
invariant distribution of the process. One important case is the limit of weak selection, in
which the fitness of each individual is largely independent of its payoff in the game. As
a consequence, each strategy for population R is approximately played with probability
1/m, only slightly truncated by a term ϕi, which reflects the impact of the respective
strategy. If both populations are of equal size this term is, up to a multiplicative constant,
given by
ϕi = a¯i − a¯, (6)
where a¯i denotes the average of all feasible payoffs for a player with strategy i, that is
a¯i =
∑
j aij/n, and a¯ denotes the average of all feasible payoffs for individuals in population
R, a¯ =
∑
i,j aij/(mn).
7 Since this mutation-selection process does not settle down on any
stable state, the deviation terms ϕi take the role of the major characteristic of the system.
It is said that selection favors strategy i if ϕi is positive (?). Furthermore, one may compare
two different strategies with each other: Antal et al. (2009) call strategy i more abundant
than strategy k if ϕi > ϕk. In effect, this approach allows a ranking of the strategies -
based on the long run performance of each strategy in the above described evolutionary
process.
However, it is easy to show that this evolutionary equilibrium exhibits the same framing
effects as the QRE. In fact, calculating ϕ for the example in the previous section (for
x = 60) yields ϕRL = −5 and ϕ
R
H = 5 in the case of representation (3), respectively
ϕRL = 3.75 and ϕ
R
H = −3.75 in the case of representation (4). Hence, neither does the
absolute value of ϕRL allow a consistent assessment across the different treatments, nor is
the order of H and L left invariant. In the case of weak selection and uniform mutations,
one can easily determine the reason for this inconistency: While in the first representation,
the outside option is played by roughly 1/3 of all column-players, this fraction increases
to approximately 1/2 of the C-population if there are two outside options, which in turn
encourages row-players to choose strategy L.
7This expression for ϕi resembles the well-known replicator dynamics, where it is assumed that the
frequency of players with strategy i increases if the payoff ui exceeds the average payoff in the population
u¯ (see, for example ?). However, while the payoffs ui and u¯ may vary over time, depending on the current
state of population, the term ϕi is constant and does only depend on the payoff matrix.
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3 An Impossibility Result
Let us turn to the question whether it is possible to construct other equilibrium notions
(or other parametrizations of the QRE, respectively more general evolutionary equilibria)
that avoid the inconsistencies shown in the previous section. For simplicity, we focus on
two-player normal form games and identify each game Γ with its payoff matrix. For this
reason, denote by M =
{
(aij , bij) : aij , bij ∈ R
}
the set of all payoff matrices for normal
form games, and let Mk ⊂ M be the set of all payoff matrices that have exactly k rows
(i.e., that admit k pure strategies for the row-player).
Definition 1 (Assessment formula)
A game theoretic assessment is a function f :Mk → R
k.
One may interpret each entry of f(M) as the predicted equilibrium frequencies for the
row-player in the normal form game defined by the payoff matrix M .8 In particular, note
that the above definition of game theoretic assessments includes the logit equilibrium pˆ
and the evolutionary assessment ϕ from the previous section.
In order to exclude framing effects, we demand that equivalent representations of a
game lead to the same assessments. Up to a renumbering of the strategies of the column-
player, we say that two matrices M,Mˆ ∈ Mk are equivalent if they result in the same
matrix after deleting all columns that are a copy of a previous column. More formally,
M ∼ Mˆ if for all columns j of M there is a column l in Mˆ such that (aij , bij) = (aˆil, bˆil)
for all rows i (and vice versa, for all columns l in Mˆ there is such a column j in M).
Obviously, this defines an equivalence relation on the set Mk for all k.
Definition 2 (Consistent assessment formulas)
Fix a k ≥ 2. An assessment formula f : Mk → R
k is called consistent if it has the
following properties:
(i) Non-manipulability: If M,K ∈ Mk and K ∼M then f(K) = f(M).
9
(ii) Validity: If the row-player’s strategy i is strictly dominated, then i cannot be optimal,
fi(M) < maxj fj(M).
Non-manipulability means that a consistent assessment is well-defined with respect to
the above equivalence relation, i.e. it respects that two matrices M,Mˆ with M ∼ Mˆ
8In this case one can restrict the image of the game theoretic assessment to the unit simplex ∆k instead
of Rk. Since equilibria need not to be unique, this interpretation requires that for each game one particular
equilibrium is selected out of the set of possible equilibria.
9A similar condition can be found, for example, in Milnor’s famous work on games against nature, see
Milnor (1951).
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represent the same game. Validity excludes constant assessment formulas from being
considered. After these preparations, we are able to formulate the main result:
Theorem 3 (An impossibility theorem)
There is no assessment fromula that is both, consistent and differentiable.
Proof. We show the case k = 2: Suppose there is such a consistent and differentiable
assessment f and consider the arbitrary but fixed matrix
M =
[
(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
.
Let ∂f/∂αij denote the marginal change of the assessment if the row-player’s payoff in
the i-th row and the jth column is varied. The idea of the proof is as follows: Non-
manipulability implies that all partial derivatives ∂f/∂αij(M) are zero, which suggests
that the value of f(M) is independent of the values of aij. This in turn contradicts
validity. To show that the derivatives equal zero, we define the two matrices
M1(t) =
[
(a11 + t, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
and
M2(t) =
[
(a11 + t, b11) (a11 + t, b11) (a11 + t, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a21, b21) (a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
.
M2(t) is obtained from M1(t) by doubling the first column two times. Note that M1(0) =
M . Next we define two functions that measure how the respective strategy assessments
vary with t, i.e. we define ui : R → R
k with ui(t) = f
(
Mi(t)
)
for i = 1, 2. Since
M1(t) ∼ M2(t) for all t, non-manipulability implies that u1(t) = u2(t). In particular,
the derivatives for t = 0 coincide:
u′1(0) =
∂f
∂α11
(M) =
∂f
∂α11
(
M2(0)
)
+
∂f
∂α12
(
M2(0)
)
+
∂f
∂α13
(
M2(0)
)
= u′2(0). (7)
Therefore, since we want to show ∂f/∂α11(M) = 0, we have to compute the expression
on the right hand’s side of (7). For this reason, we define two new matrices:
M3(t) =
[
(a11, b11) (a11, b11) (a11 + t, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a21, b21) (a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
and
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M4(t) =
[
(a11, b11) (a11 + t, b11) (a11 + t, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a21, b21) (a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
.
Note that these two matrices have the same reduced normal form and hence are equivalent.
Additionally, they fulfill M3(0) = M4(0) = M2(0). If we again define functions ui(t) =
f
(
Mi(t)
)
for i = 3, 4, we may conclude that
u′3(0) =
∂f
∂α13
(
M2(0)
)
=
∂f
∂α12
(
M2(0)
)
+
∂f
∂α13
(
M2(0)
)
= u′4(0), (8)
and therefore ∂f/∂α12
(
M2(0)
)
= 0. With a similar calculation one can show that the other
two expressions on the right hand’s side of (7) , ∂f/∂α11
(
M2(0)
)
and ∂f/∂α13
(
M2(0)
)
,
vanish as well. Therefore, we indeed end up with ∂f/∂α11(M) = 0. A symmetry argument
then immediately implies that ∂f/∂αij(M) = 0 for all i and j. As a consequence, the
assessment f(M) does not vary in the row-player’s payoffs, which leads to a contradiction
with the validity of the assessment.
Therefore, we must conclude that there is no reasonable equilibrium concept that is
both, non-manipulable and smooth. If we interpret the value of fi(M) slightly differently,
as an indicator of the performance of strategy i, then the previous theorem states that is
impossible to measure the success of a strategy with a differentiable formula.
In particular, the inconsistencies of the evolutionary assessment ϕ cannot be simply
attributed to the assumption of weak selection. Even in the case of some positive but finite
selection pressure δ, the stationary distribution in Ohtsuki (2010) depends differentiably
on the entries of the payoff matrix.
4 Discussion
Explaining human behaviour with game theoretic models faces at least two difficulties.
Firstly, the modeller does usually not know the exact subjective utilities of the agents;
instead there might be only some rough estimates. In order to obtain robust results, one
might therefore require that the output of the model depends differentiably on the input
data. Secondly, in order to set up the model, the researcher needs to choose one specific
description of reality, out of many alternatively possible descriptions. One such choice
might entail, for example, to determine whether a certain player has only one outside
option or several similar options. In the best case - if the methods are consistent in the
sense defined above - the exact representation of the game does not affect the qualitative
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results.
However, as we have shown, the two requirements of consistency and differentiability
are incompatible. If the results of a game theoretic equilibrium notion depend differ-
entiably on the payoffs, then these results also depend on the representation. In this
sense, solution concepts for games in strategic form are necessarily imperfect. Therefore
any game theoretic concept that can be applied to normal form games faces the choice
whether it violates one requirement or the other. The matrix presented as Tab. 1 attempts
to give an overview over some choices that were made. It classifies some popular game
theoretic tools according to whether they violate the smooth dependence on payoffs condi-
tion or the non-manipulability condition. Of course, such a list is notoriously incomplete
and each cell of this matrix might contain several other elements - with the exception of
the cell that corresponds to the differentiable and consistent concepts.
A natural question is then to ask which of the two requirements is the more indis-
pensable one. Differentiable equilibrium notions, and in particular the QRE, are quite
successful in predicting human behaviour for normal form games - once it is known which
representation of the game the subjects choose. In laboratory experiments this is certainly
no problem, since it may be assumed that the players’ internal model of the game is close
to the instructions that are provided by the experimenter (in particular it is likely that
all subjects have a similar internal representation). From a behavioural point of view,
the framing effects presented in the previous sections even seem to be a desirable feature
- after all it is well documented that humans are subject to framing effects as well.10
Psychologically, it is not unreasonable to expect that a duplication of the outside option
increases the number of L players in game (3). The outside options may act as a coordi-
nation device: Because both options point to the low equilibrium, this equilibrium may
be interpreted as a focal point (Schelling, 1960).
However, if it comes to explain human behaviour in the field it is not at all clear how
individuals perceive their interactions, let alone that these perceptions are comparable
across subjects. For theoretical modeling, the above described framing effects are unde-
sirable (or even dangerous). If an equilibrium concept leads to predictions that depend on
the representation of the game (which is chosen by the modeler himself), then the results
will be somewhat arbitrary in the best case and manipulable in the worst.
A possible solution to avoid framing effects in differentiable equilibrium notions is
to consider the equivalence class of a game. That is, instead of calculating the logit
10For the related question whether subjects in dynamic games play differently if confronted with different
game trees that represent formally equivalent games, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1998).
11
Differentiable concepts Non-differentiable concepts
C
on
si
st
en
t
co
n
ce
p
ts
Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950)
Refinements of the Nash equilibrium
Perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975)
Proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978)
Approaches that apply the Nash equilib-
rium to transformed utilities
Fairness model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
Learning processes for which Nash equilib-
ria are rest points
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951)
Replicator dynamics
(Taylor and Jonker, 1978)
Best response dynamics
(Gilboa and Matsui, 1991)
In
co
n
si
st
en
t
co
n
ce
p
ts
Behavioural equilibrium notions
QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995)
Level-k reasoning model
(Stahl and Wilson, 1995)
Noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004)
Smooth learning processes
Exponential fictitious play
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998)
Long run equilibria for evolutionary
processes with uniform mutations and
smooth selection
Moran process (Antal et al., 2009;
Ohtsuki, 2010)
Long run equilibria for evolutionary pro-
cesses with uniform mutations and best-
reply selection
Moran process with strong selection
(Fudenberg et al., 2006)
Table 1: A classification of game theoretic concepts
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equilibrium pˆλ(M) of a game M one may calculate the set of possible logit equilibria
pˆλ([M ]) for all games that are equivalent to M ,
[M ] =
{
Mˆ ∈ Mk
∣∣ Mˆ ∼M} . (9)
However, in this case, the logit equilibrium loses its ability to select a unique Nash equi-
librium in the limit of rational agents, λ → ∞. Instead, most of the Nash equilibria of
a game M (including all strict Nash equilibria) are predictable by the unique branch of
pˆλ(Mˆ) - if only the game is appropriately framed. Therefore, it seems to me that the
solution concept of the Nash equilibrium is (almost, see Selten, 1975; Myerson, 1978) as
good as it gets.
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